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COMMENTS




Magistrate judges are "nothing less than indispensable" to
the modern judicial system.1 While they are not Article III judges,
they perform duties that Article III judges would otherwise per-
form, including presiding over civil jury trials,2 conducting misde-
meanor trials,3 and conducting voir dire and presiding over jury
selection in felony trials.4 These powers may be delegated to mag-
istrate judges under the Federal Magistrate Act of 19795 (FMA
1979) and its subsequent amendments. In addition to specifically
enumerated powers, the FMA6 provides that "magistrate judge [s]
may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States."7
This Additional Duties Clause was designed to provide flexi-
bility, allowing courts to experiment with delegating duties not
specifically contemplated by Congress.8 Such experiments have
not always been upheld, though, and the clause has been inter-
preted to have limitations beyond the textual rule that such du-
ties may not be "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
t AB 2012, Harvard College; JD Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago Law
School.
1 Peretz v United States, 501 US 923, 928 (1991), quoting Government of the Virgin
Islands v Williams, 892 F2d 305, 308 (3d Cir 1989).
2 See 28 USC § 636(c)(1).
3 See 28 USC § 636(a)(3); 18 USC § 3401.
4 See Peretz, 501 US at 935-36, 940 (approving the delegation of these duties with
the parties' consent).
5 Pub L No 96-82, 93 Stat 643.
6 Throughout this Comment, "the FMA" refers to the current code, while "FMA
19XX" refers to the act passed in year 19XX.
7 28 USC § 636(b)(3).
8 Jurisdiction of U.S. Magistrates, HR Rep No 94-1609, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 12 (1976).
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the United States."9 For example, it is broadly recognized that
magistrate judges may not conduct felony trials under the FMA.10
These additional limitations have been derived not from the
Constitution, but from the FMA itself."i
The Supreme Court has held that delegations under the
Additional Duties Clause should be "comparable in responsibility
and importance to"12 and "bear some relation to" the enumerated
duties.13 Thus, when determining which powers are delegable to
magistrate judges under the Additional Duties Clause, circuit
courts compare the duty sought to be delegated with those specif-
ically enumerated in the FMA.14
The circuits agree about many of the powers that may be del-
egated, but have divided over whether magistrate judges are em-
powered by the FMA to accept felony guilty pleas.15 Three circuits-
the Tenth,16 Eleventh,17 and Fourth'&-have held that magistrate
judges may accept felony guilty pleas, while the Seventh Circuit has
held that magistrate judges may conduct plea colloquies19 but may
not formally accept guilty pleas.20
Accepting a felony guilty plea has significant legal conse-
quences, directly affecting a defendant's rights following the
plea's acceptance. Until a guilty plea is formally accepted, a de-
fendant may withdraw the plea as a matter of course, "for any
9 28 USC § 636(b)(3). For an example of one such interpretation, see Gomez v United
States, 490 US 858, 864-65 (1989) ("When a statute ... assigns specific duties [to an of-
fice], those duties outline the attributes of the office. Any additional duties performed pur-
suant to a general authorization . .. reasonably should bear some relation to the specified
duties.").
10 See Gomez, 490 US at 871-72.
11 See, for example, id.
12 Peretz, 501 US at 933.
13 Gomez, 490 US at 864.
14 See, for example, United States v Woodard, 387 F3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir 2004)
(per curiam) ("[Wle find that conducting a Rule 11 proceeding is comparable to the FMA's
enumerated duties. Therefore, we .. . hold[] that a magistrate judge has the authority
under the 'additional duties' clause of FMA to conduct Rule 11 proceedings when the de-
fendant consents.").
i5 See United States v Harden, 758 F3d 886, 891 (7th Cir 2014) ("We note that our
reasoning [that magistrate judges may not accept guilty pleas] places us in conflict with
several of our sister circuits.").
16 See United States v Ciapponi, 77 F3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir 1996).
17 See Woodard, 387 F3d at 1333.
18 See United States v Benton, 523 F3d 424, 433 (4th Cir 2008).
19 The plea colloquy is the process, required by Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 11(b), by which the court must "address the defendant personally in open court" to
inform the defendant of his rights and the charges against him, as well as to establish that
the plea is knowing, voluntary, and factually based. FRCrP 11(b).
20 See Harden, 758 F3d at 891.
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reason or no reason."21 However, after formal acceptance but be-
fore sentencing, the plea may be withdrawn for a "fair and just"
reason.22 Ordinarily such a reason must be more than the defen-
dant's regret, and instead must be based on some flaw in the pre-
plea process, such as inadequate assistance of counsel. Therefore,
plea acceptance makes the plea legally binding and largely irrev-
ocable. After guilty plea acceptance, defendants are in the same
position they would be in after receiving a guilty verdict after
trial.23
Magistrate judges conduct a large volume of plea proceed-
ings, both in circuits that permit magistrate judges to formally
accept guilty pleas and in those that do not. In 2014 alone, mag-
istrate judges conducted 29,536 plea proceedings.24 If magistrate
judges are empowered to accept guilty pleas under the FMA, the
circuits that divide plea colloquies from plea acceptance may be
introducing needless redundancy and incurring "complete
waste [s] of judicial resources."25 If, however, magistrate judges are
not empowered to accept guilty pleas, thousands of defendants
have been prematurely bound to guilty pleas and improperly de-
nied the right to withdraw those pleas. Even if outcomes would
be affected in only 1 percent of guilty plea proceedings conducted
by magistrate judges, there could be hundreds of wrongful convic-
tions from 2014 alone.
This Comment analyzes whether the Additional Duties
Clause empowers magistrate judges to accept felony guilty pleas
under a new framework utilizing congressional guidance regard-
ing the clause's scope. Part I reviews the history of the federal
magistrate system, including historical predecessors to magis-
trate judges and the origins of the FMA. Part II canvasses exist-
ing cases on the power of magistrate judges to accept guilty pleas.
Finally, Part III introduces an objective framework for analyzing
the scope of the Additional Duties Clause. Applying this frame-
work to felony guilty pleas, Part III then argues that the FMA
does not empower magistrate judges to accept guilty pleas in fel-
ony cases, based on the evident importance that Congress assigns
21 FRCrP 11(d)(1).
22 FRCrP 11(d)(2)(B). A defendant may also withdraw a guilty plea after it has been
accepted if the court rejects the plea agreement. FRCrP 11(d)(2)(A).
23 See Harden, 758 F3d at 889.
24 Table S-17: Matters Disposed of by U.S. Magistrate Judges during the 12-Month Pe-
riods Ending September 30, 2005 through 2014 *1, archived at http://perma.ccIV9NP-KNJ7.
25 Benton, 523 F3d at 432.
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to guilty plea acceptance in the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. Part III also explores'the practical implications of denying
magistrate judges this power, both for individual defendants and
for the judicial system.
I. HISTORY OF FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
Judicial assistants and adjuncts have been a part of the
American judicial system essentially since the Founding. The pre-
cise roles, duties, and qualifications of these assistants have var-
ied over time as weaknesses in the system have been identified
and reforms have been made. As a general matter, though, these
assistants have gained increasing responsibility over time,
through both the origination of the magistrate system in the
Federal Magistrate Act and an expansive reading of the Additional
Duties Clause of the FMA. Part I traces this historical develop-
ment, with Part L.A explaining the predecessors to magistrate
judges, Part I.B describing the enactment history of the FMA, and
Part I.C addressing the history of the Additional Duties Clause
specifically. Finally, the Part concludes with a summary of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Additional Duties Clause
to date.
A. Historical Judicial Assistants and Adjuncts
To understand the role of magistrate judges within the fed-
eral judiciary, it is helpful to consider the historical develop-
ment of judicial assistants and adjuncts. The Constitution
grants Congress considerable power to structure the judicial
branch by providing in Article III that "[t]he judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish"26 and by providing Congress the complementary Article I
power "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."27
Congress has used this authority to restructure the inferior courts
repeatedly.
26 US Const Art III, § 1.
27 US Const Art I, § 8, el 9.
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The Judiciary Act of 178928 was the first congressional act to
establish inferior courts.29 It created both circuit courts and dis-
trict courts,3 0 but unlike the modern US court system, it gave cir-
cuit courts original jurisdiction over many matters, with only rel-
atively minor cases placed within the jurisdiction of the district
courts. 31 While Congress granted the newly established federal
courts the power to conduct trials, Congress allowed the states to
handle arrest and bail.32 Granting these powers exclusively to
state officials, however, was quickly found to be infeasible due to
state officials' resistance to certain federal policies, such as the
excise tax on spirits.3
To remedy this perceived flaw, Congress gave circuit courts
authority to appoint "discreet persons learned in the law" to ac-
cept bail.34 Although they had an important role in the federal ju-
dicial system, these individuals were not Article III judges, as
they were not subject to the appointment or term requirements
established in the Constitution.-1 Nonetheless, Congress repeat-
edly expanded the power of these appointees through the 1800s,
granting them powers including the ability to take affidavits and
bail in civil cases, 36 to take depositions in civil cases, to issue
arrest warrants, and to hold persons for trial.37 Despite their
ever-expanding responsibilities, however, the requirement that
appointees be "learned in the law" was removed in 1812.38 In
1817, an expansion in power was accompanied by a new title:
"commissioners."39
This increasing power was not universally welcomed. The
commissioners' compensation arrangements and ability to hold
28 1 Stat 73.
29 See Judiciary Act § 3, 1 Stat at 73-74.
30 Judiciary Act §§ 2-4, 1 Stat at 73-75.
31 See Judiciary Act §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat at 76-79; Leslie G. Foschio, A History of the
Development of the Office of United States Commissioner and Magistrate Judge System, 1
Fed Cts L Rev 607, 608 (2006) ("District court jurisdiction was initially limited to admi-
ralty cases, seizures and forfeitures, and federal crimes carrying a penalty up to six
months or thirty lashes.").
32 Foschio, 1 Fed Cts L Rev at 608 (cited in note 31).
33 Id.
34 Act of Mar 2, 1793 § 4, 1 Stat 333, 334.
35 See notes 69-71 and accompanying text. See also US Const Art III, § 1.
36 Act of Mar 1, 1817, 3 Stat 350.
37 Act of Aug 23, 1842 § 1, 5 Stat 516, 516-17.
38 See Act of Feb 20, 1812, 2 Stat 679, 680-81.
39 Act of Mar 1, 1817, 3 Stat at 350.
2017] 913
The University of Chicago Law Review
other offices led to criticisms of their perceived profit-seeking mo-
tives. 40 To address these criticisms, the system was reformed in
1896 to establish a uniform four-year term, a uniform fee sched-
ule, and a prohibition against holding certain other offices.41 While
the reforms were largely successful, concerns remained that com-
missioner fees were too low to attract qualified commissioners
and, relatedly, that too few commissioners had legal training.42
The next major development in the commissioner system
came in 1942, when the director of the Administrative Office of
the US Courts prepared a study on the office of commissioner.43
The study was requested by the Judicial Conference of the United
States, the policy-making body for the federal courts, 44 in response
to pending legislation that would have further expanded the com-
missioners' jurisdiction.45 The report described the role of the com-
missioner as that of "a Federal justice of the peace" and "an ad-
junct of the district courts with independent but subordinate
judicial powers."46 The study ultimately concluded that the com-
missioner system "st[ood] in great need of improvement" and that
"[s]omething should be done."47 Despite this perceived need and
the extensive study undertaken, the report concluded that "[j]ust
what line change should take may not [ ] be so clear."48 With that
ambiguous call for change, another twenty-six years passed be-
fore additional major reform came to the system.
B. Original Enactment and Subsequent Amendments of the
Federal Magistrate Act
After decades of discussion and debate, in 1968 the Federal
Magistrates Act49 (FMA 1968) abolished the old commissioner
40 See Foschio, 1 Fed Cts L Rev at 610-11 (cited in note 31). This motivation was
particularly stark in the compensation for fugitive slave cases, in which commissioners
were paid more for ordering alleged slaves to be returned to their alleged owners than for
permitting alleged slaves to remain free. Id at 609.
41 Act of May 28, 1896 §§ 19-21, 29 Stat 140, 184-85.
42 See Foschio, 1 Fed Cts L Rev at 611-13 (cited in note 31).
43 See generally United States Commissioners: A Report to the Judicial Conference
(Administrative Office of the US Courts 1942).
44 About the Judicial Conference (Administrative Office of the US Courts), archived
at http://perma.cc/79WE-YX5R.
45 United States Commissioners at 1-2 (cited in note 43). For the proposed legislation
that would have expanded commissioners' jurisdiction, see HR 6902, 77th Cong, 2d Sess,
in 88 Cong Rec 3375 (Apr 6, 1942).
46 United States Commissioners at 3 (cited in note 43).
47 Id at 52.
4s Id.
49 Pub L No 90-578, 82 Stat 1107 (1968).
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system entirely, replacing commissioners with "magistrates."50
Responsibility for administering the magistrate system, includ-
ing determining the number of magistrates as well as the type,
location, and salary of each magistrate position, was given to the
Judicial Conference.51 FMA 1968 gave magistrates broader power
than had ever been available to commissioners, providing them
with not only "all powers and duties conferred or imposed upon
United States commissioners,"52 but also "the power to administer
oaths and affirmations, impose conditions of release . . , and take
acknowledgments, affidavits, and depositions"53 and the power to
conduct certain minor criminal trials.54 Further, FMA 1968 pro-
vided that, with "the concurrence of a majority of all the judges"
of a district, magistrates in that district could be granted "such
additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States."55
The vagueness of "additional duties" quickly led to conflicting
court decisions on the exact boundaries of this power. For exam-
ple, a circuit split developed regarding whether magistrates were
empowered under FMA 1968 to conduct evidentiary hearings in
federal habeas corpus cases. 56 In Wingo v Wedding,5? the Supreme
Court resolved this split by narrowly construing the power of
magistrates, concluding that FMA 1968 had not "changed the re-
quirement ... that federal judges personally conduct habeas cor-
pus evidentiary hearings."58 Congress responded by passing the
1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act59 (FMA 1976),
which were intended to "clarify the powers of magistrates."60 The
amendments expanded magistrates' power beyond the limits in
Wingo by explicitly permitting magistrates "to hear habeas cor-
pus and prisoner civil rights actions, to review administrative de-
terminations of Social Security benefits, and to issue reports and
50 FMA 1968 § 101, 82 Stat at 1108-14, codified as amended at 28 USC §§ 631-39.
51 FMA 1968 § 101, 82 Stat at 1111, codified as amended at 28 USC § 633(b).
52 FMA 1968 § 101, 82 Stat at 1113, codified as amended at 28 USC § 636(a)(1).
53 FMA 1968 § 101, 82 Stat at 1113, codified as amended at 28 USC § 636(a)(2).
54 See FMA 1968 § 101, 82 Stat at 1113, codified as amended at 28 USC § 636(a)(3).
55 FMA 1968 § 101, 82 Stat at 1113, codified as amended at 28 USC § 636(b).
56 Compare O'Shea v United States, 491 F2d 774, 778 (1st Cir 1974), with Wedding
v Wingo, 483 F2d 1131, 1132-33 (6th Cir 1973).
57 418 US 461 (1974).
58 Id at 469-73.
59 Act of Oct 21, 1976, Pub L No 94-577, 90 Stat 2729, codified as amended at 28
USC § 636(b).
60 Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 39
Valp U L Rev 661, 665 (2005).
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recommendations concerning motions to dismiss and for sum-
mary judgment."61 This expansion continued when Congress
passed the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, which further "in-
creased the role, responsibilities, and status of the magistrate."62
FMA 1979 authorized magistrates, upon the consent of the par-
ties, to try civil cases and to enter final judgment in those cases.63
It also authorized delegation to magistrates of all federal misde-
meanor trials, rather than the more limited criminal authority
authorized by FMA 1968.64 Finally, FMA 1979 made several
changes to the magistrate appointment process.65 The expanded
power of magistrates was symbolically reflected in the Judicial Im-
provements Act of 199066 (JIA), which officially changed the title of
these officers from "United States magistrate" to "United States
magistrate judge."67 The policy rationale for the ever-expanding
power of magistrate judges is illuminated by the other reforms in
JIA, which included the requirement for district courts to adopt a
"civil justice expense and delay reduction plan."68 Despite these
changes, magistrate judges remain distinct from Article III
judges in their appointment,69 tenure, 70 and jurisdiction.71
In addition to expanding magistrate judges' powers, Congress
added specificity regarding these powers, the role of the parties'
consent, and the interaction of magistrate judges with district
courts. 72 Currently, without any specific designation from a dis-
trict judge, a magistrate judge may exercise all the powers of the
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 FMA 1979 § 2(2), 93 Stat at 643, codified as amended at 28 USC § 636(c)(1).
64 See FMA 1979 § 7(a)(1), 93 Stat at 645, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3401(a).
65 For example, the rules governing the ability of magistrates to serve in adjoining
districts were modified. See FMA 1979 § 3(a), 93 Stat at 644, codified as amended at 28
USC § 631(a).
66 Pub L No 101-650, 104 Stat 5089.
67 JIA § 321, 104 Stat at 5117, codified as amended at 28 USC § 631 note.
68 JIA § 103(a), 104 Stat at 5090, codified as amended at 28 USC § 471.
69 Compare 28 USC § 631(a) (providing for the appointment of magistrate judges by
district court judges), with US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2 (providing the president the power to
appoint "judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States," with
the advice and consent of the Senate).
70 Compare 28 USC § 631(e) (providing magistrate judges eight-year terms), with US
Const Art III, § 1 (requiring that judges be granted life tenure).
71 Compare 28 USC § 636 (outlining the jurisdiction of magistrate judges), with 28
USC §§ 1331-69 and 18 USC § 3231 (outlining the jurisdiction of district courts).
72 See, for example, JIA § 308(a), 104 Stat at 5112, codified as amended at 28 USC
§ 636(c)(2); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 §§ 201-02, Pub L No 104-317, 110
Stat 3847, 3848-49, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3401 and 28 USC § 636; Federal
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former US commissioners,78 administer oaths and take affida-
vits,74 conduct misdemeanor trials,75 enter sentences for petty of-
fenses,76 and enter sentences for class A misdemeanors with the
parties' consent. 77 However, while a magistrate judge may handle
almost "any pretrial matter pending before the court," a magis-
trate judge has jurisdiction over such matters only upon designa-
tion from a district judge.78 Further, actions taken by a magistrate
judge pursuant to pretrial matters are reviewable by the district
court for clear error. 79 For those pretrial matters specifically with-
held from magistrate judges by statute, district judges may des-
ignate magistrate judges to hold hearings and submit recommen-
dations.80 Additionally, magistrate judges may serve as special
masters pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure or in any civil case with the parties' consent. 81 With the con-
sent of the parties, magistrate judges may also conduct all pro-
ceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter, including ordering final
entry of judgment.82 Finally, the Additional Duties Clause pro-
vides that "[a] magistrate judge may be assigned such additional
duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States."83
Due to magistrate judges' broad role and the heavy federal
caseload, magistrate judges are considered "indispensable" to the
judicial system. 84 One indicator of the scale of the magistrate
Courts Improvement Act of 2000 §§ 202-03, Pub L No 106-518, 114 Stat 2410, 2412-14,
codified at 18 USC § 3401 and 28 USC § 636.
73 28 USC § 636(a)(1).
74 28 USC § 636(a)(2).
75 See 28 USC § 636(a)(3); 18 USC § 3401.
76 28 USC § 636(a)(4).
77 28 USC § 636(a)(5).
78 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(A). The exceptions are:
motion[s] for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judg-
ment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant,
to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of
a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.
28 USC § 636(b)(1)(A).
79 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(A).
80 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(B).
81 28 USC § 636(b)(2). See also FRCP 53.
82 28 USC § 636(c)(1).
83 28 USC § 636(b)(3).
84 Peretz v United States, 501 US 923, 928-29 & n 5 (1991), quoting Government of
the Virgin Islands v Williams, 892 F2d 305, 308 (3d Cir 1989).
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judges' work is that, in the year before September 2014, magis-
trate judges disposed of 1,102,396 matters.85 Notably, over half of
these matters-580,462-fell under the Additional Duties Clause
of § 636(b)(3).86 This total includes 29,536 guilty plea proceed-
ings87--or, based on data from the year ending in March 2014,
likely over a third of the total guilty pleas during this period.88
C. Role and Scope of the Additional Duties Clause
The Additional Duties Clause was designed to provide courts
flexibility to "experiment" with delegating matters that do not fit
directly into any of the magistrate judges' enumerated powers. 89
However, the legislative history suggests that there are limita-
tions on the types of experimentation envisioned, as one of the
ultimate goals was to promote the "unhurried performance" by
district judges of their core duties.90 This focus on ensuring that
Article III judges are able to devote sufficient attention to their
core duties implies that those core duties cannot be delegated to
magistrate judges.
The only explicit textual limitation on the powers assignable
under this clause is that such duties must not be "inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States."91 Constitu-
tional limits on assignment are based on concern for both individ-
ual rights and structural protections,92 including the separation
of powers and the nondelegation doctrine. The combination of
these principles suggests that neither Congress nor the courts
themselves are constitutionally empowered to delegate the "judi-
cial power" to anyone other than Article III judges. Despite these
theoretical limits, though, no delegations of power to magistrate
judges have been struck down as unconstitutional to date.
85 Table S-1 7: Matters Disposed of by U.S. Magistrate Judges at *1 (cited in note 24).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See Table D-4: U.S. District Courts-Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Type of
Disposition and Offense, during the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2014 *1, archived
at http://perma.cc/VKP2-8KQY (noting that 80,111 criminal defendants pleaded guilty in
US district courts in the year ending March 31, 2014).
89 HR Rep No 94-1609 at 12 (cited in note 8) (explaining that the Additional Duties
Clause "enables the district courts to continue innovative experimentations in the use of
this judicial officer").
90 Id ("If district judges are willing to experiment with the assignment to magistrates
of other functions . .. ,there will be increased time available to judges for the careful and
unhurried performance of their vital and traditional adjudicatory duties.").
91 28 USC § 636(b)(3).
92 See Peretz, 501 US at 936-40.
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However, courts have broadly agreed that the narrow textual
limitation should not be understood to mean that everything con-
stitutionally permissible and not directly prohibited by statute is
permitted under the FMA.93 If all constitutionally permissible del-
egations were authorized by the Additional Duties Clause, then
this clause would authorize all of the powers specifically enumer-
ated in other provisions of the FMA. Such a reading would render
the specific enumeration of delegable duties in the FMA super-
fluous. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted the duty of
courts "to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
statute," even "describing this rule as a cardinal principle of stat-
utory construction."94
Similarly, the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius
cautions against an overly expansive reading of the Additional
Duties Clause. For example, a frequently cited limitation is that
magistrate judges may not preside over felony trials under
§ 636(b)(3).95 This limitation is inferred despite the fact that "a
literal reading [of] this additional duties clause would permit
magistrates to conduct felony trials."96 The doctrine of expressio
unius requires such a limitation, because, as the Supreme Court
has recognized, the specific grant of power to preside over misde-
meanor trials implies the withholding of power to preside over
felony trials.97
The ejusdem generis canon further suggests that the Additional
Duties Clause should not be read to provide the full extent of
powers its literal text would suggest. Under this doctrine, "where
general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration,
the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar
in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific
93 See, for example, Gomez v United States, 490 US 858, 871-72 (1989) (holding that
the delegation of jury selection in felony trials to magistrate judges is not permissible un-
der the FMA, without holding that such delegation would be unconstitutional).
94 Duncan v Walker, 533 US 167, 174 (2001) (quotation marks omitted), quoting
United States v Menasche, 348 US 528, 538-39 (1955), and Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362,
404 (2000).
95 See, for example, Gomez, 490 US at 871-72.
96 Id.
97 See id at 872 ("[T]he carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil
matters and of minor criminal cases should be construed as an implicit withholding of the
authority to preside at a felony trial."). It is worth mentioning that, while the exclusion of
felony trials has primarily been addressed as a matter of congressional intent, there are
also serious arguments that such a delegation would be unconstitutional. See id at 863-
64 (noting the "abiding concerns regarding the constitutionality of delegating felony trial
duties to magistrates" before proceeding to the statutory interpretation question under
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance).
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words."98 Given the structure of § 636, which includes a specific
list of identified duties followed by a seemingly broad, general
grant, ejusdem generis seems applicable.99 It is clear, then, that
ordinary principles of statutory interpretation suggest a reading
of the Additional Duties Clause that is more limited than its lit-
eral text. The next Section discusses the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of these limitations to date.
D. Supreme Court Precedent on the Scope of the Additional
Duties Clause
Given the vagueness of the Additional Duties Clause, delega-
tions to magistrate judges under this clause have been the subject
of significant litigation. In multiple cases, the Supreme Court
has determined the assignability of duties under the Additional
Duties Clause by comparing the duty sought to be assigned with
the duties specifically enumerated in the FMA.100 The Court has
also suggested that the parties' consent is relevant for at least
some duties.101
The Supreme Court first considered the Additional Duties
Clause in Mathews v Weber.102 The plaintiff challenged an admin-
istrative determination that he was not entitled to Medicare re-
imbursement for certain medical payments. 103 The case was re-
ferred to a magistrate, who made initial findings of fact and
recommendations to the district judge.104 Under the referral or-
der, the district judge retained final decision-making authority
and the right to review evidence de novo. 105 Nonetheless, the de-
fendant moved to vacate the reference to the magistrate, arguing
98 Washington State Department of Social and Health Services v Guardianship Estate
of Keffeler, 537 US 371, 384 (2003) (brackets omitted).
99 Justice Antonin Scalia recognized the relevance of ejusdem generis in his Peretz
dissent. See Peretz, 501 US at 955 (Scalia dissenting) ("The canon of ejusdem generis keeps
the 'additional duties' clause from swallowing up the rest of the statute."). While no
majority opinion interpreting the Additional Duties Clause has invoked this canon, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of this clause has nonetheless incorporated the rule that
the additional duties must be somewhat similar to those enumerated. See Part I.D.
100 See, for example, Gomez, 490 US at 864; Peretz, 501 US at 933 ("[W]e would
still be reluctant, as we were in Gomez, to construe the additional duties clause to
include responsibilities of far greater importance than the specified duties assigned to
magistrates.").
101 See Peretz, 501 US at 932.
102 423 US 261 (1976).
103 Id at 263.
104 Id at 263-64.
105 Id at 270-71.
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that it was unauthorized under the FMA.106 The Court disagreed,
holding that "[u]nder the part of the order at issue the magis-
trates perform a limited function" and that the FMA permitted
the delegation.107 The Court emphasized that the magistrate had
a "limited role" in performing a "preliminary-review function"
that served to "help[ ] focus the court's attention on the relevant
portions of what may be a voluminous record, from a point of view
as neutral as that of an Article III judge."108 Such a limited role, the
Court concluded, "f[ell] well within the range of duties Congress
empowered the district courts to assign to" magistrates, thus im-
plicitly comparing the importance of the duty at issue to those
specifically enumerated in the FMA.109 While the Court declined
to "define the full reach of a magistrate's authority under the Act"
in Mathews,110 it effectively established that the importance and
independence of a duty should be compared to those specifically
enumerated in determining the duty's assignability.
The Court first struck down a delegation to a magistrate in
Gomez v United States,"' in which a magistrate was assigned the
duty of performing voir dire for a felony trial.112 When the district
judge assigned jury selection to a magistrate, Jose Gomez and
Diego Chavez-Tesina's counsel made timely objections to the as-
signment."s Nonetheless, the magistrate proceeded to perform
voir dire and jury selection.11 Following jury selection, the district
judge offered to review any ruling de novo, but the defense
brought no specific challenges, simply objecting to the magis-
trate's role."1 After being found guilty, Gomez and Chavez-Tesina
appealed, bringing no specific challenges to the jurors selected but
alleging "that the [m]agistrate had no power to conduct the voir
dire examination and jury selection."116 The Supreme Court over-
turned the convictions, holding that jury selection in a felony trial
106 Mathews, 423 US at 265. In the district court, the defendant "also argued that the
reference was of doubtful constitutionality," but he "expressly declined" to argue the con-
stitutional point before the Supreme Court. Id.
107 Id at 270.
108 Id at 271.
109 Id at 270.
110 Mathews, 423 US at 270.
Mu 490 US 858 (1989).
112 Id at 860.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Gomez, 490 US at 861.
116 Id (emphasis omitted).
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is not assignable to a magistrate under the FMA, at least without
the parties' consent.1 17
The Court narrowly construed the FMA's Additional Duties
Clause in Gomez in part due to the principle of constitutional
avoidance, because the Court doubted the constitutionality of
magistrates conducting voir dire.118 Specifically, the Court had
"serious doubts that a district judge could review [voir dire] mean-
ingfully," due to the importance of in-person interaction with ju-
rors.11 9 Further, the Court reaffirmed the principle from Mathews
that any duties assigned under the Additional Duties Clause
should be compared to those specifically enumerated, noting,
"When a statute creates an office to which it assigns specific du-
ties, those duties outline the attributes of the office. Any addi-
tional duties performed pursuant to a general authorization in
the statute reasonably should bear some relation to the specified
duties."120 Based on this principle, the Court concluded that it was
unlikely that Congress intended to grant a duty as important as
voir dire to magistrates in "[t]he absence of a specific reference to
jury selection in the statute, or indeed, in the legislative history."121
The magistrate's power to conduct jury selection came before
the Court again in Peretz v United States.122 When the district
judge in Peretz sought the parties' consent to assign jury selection
to a magistrate, the defendant's counsel responded that he "would
love the opportunity" to select the jury before a magistrate.123 Nei-
ther the defendant nor his counsel objected to the role of the mag-
istrate in voir dire until appeal.124 Ultimately, the Court held that
the selection of a jury in a felony trial is assignable with the par-
ties' consent.1 25 The Court concluded that "those specified duties
that were comparable to jury selection in a felony trial could be
performed only with the consent of the litigants" under the
FMA.126 The "specified duties" that the Court considered "compa-
rable to jury selection" included the power "to try minor offenses,"
to "be designated as a special master in any civil case," and to try
117 Id at 875--76.
118 Id at 863-64.
119 Gomez, 490 US at 874-75 (explaining that an examiner during voir dire "must
elicit from prospective jurors candid answers about intimate details of their lives").
120 Id at 864.
121 Id at 875.
122 501 US 923 (1991).
123 Id at 925.
124 Id.
125 Id at 932-33.
126 Peretz, 501 US at 931.
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"all misdemeanors."127 Because the Court believed these duties
were of similar importance to jury selection, and because these
duties were entrusted to magistrates with the consent of the par-
ties, the Court believed jury selection could also be entrusted to
magistrates with the consent of the parties.128 The Peretz opinion
emphasized that the Court "would still be reluctant . . . to con-
strue the additional duties clause to include responsibilities of
far greater importance than the specified duties assigned to
magistrates."129
In response to constitutional arguments, the Peretz Court
held that the parties' prior consent had waived any constitutional
concerns. 130 The Court reasoned that only individual rights were
at issue in the assignment, and defendants are able to waive even
fundamental individual rights.131 Had there been "structural" con-
cerns implicated, such as the separation of powers, the defendant
may not have been able to waive them.132 However, because the
district court retained the right to decide whether to assign voir
dire to a magistrate and the ability to review determinations de
novo, the Court held that no structural concerns were involved.133
In applying these precedents, circuit courts have noted that
the Court repeatedly emphasized in these cases that, with or
without the parties' consent, the relevant inquiry is the "respon-
sibility and importance" of the duty as compared to those enumer-
ated in the FMA.134 A duty of significantly greater importance or
127 Id (quotation marks omitted).
128 Id at 933.
129 Id.
130 Peretz, 501 US at 936-37.
131 Id.
132 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Schor, 478 US 833, 850-51 (1986) ("To
the extent that [a] structural principle is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot by
consent cure the constitutional difficulty.").
133 Peretz, 501 US at 937. The majority did not express the same concerns over the
reviewability of voir dire as the Court had in Gomez, a seeming inconsistency raised by
Justice Thurgood Marshall in his Peretz dissent. See id at 945 (Marshall dissenting)
("[D]ifficulties in providing effective review of magistrate jury selection were central to our
construction of the [Federal Magistrate] Act in Gomez, yet they are essentially ignored
today.").
The result in Peretz was confirmed in Gonzalez v United States, 553 US 242 (2008),
the Court's most recent case involving the Additional Duties Clause and the assignment
of voir dire in a felony trial. The primary issue in Gonzalez was whether a defendant had
to personally consent to the assignment of voir dire to a magistrate judge or whether a
defendant's attorney could provide the requisite consent. Id at 243-44. The Court held
that the consent required to make the magistrate judge's exercise of authority permissible
in this context can come from the defendant's attorney. Id at 245.
134 United States v Harden, 758 F3d 886, 888 (7th Cir 2014).
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complexity than any of those specifically enumerated is properly
reserved to Article III judges alone.135
II. CHALLENGES TO THE ABILITY OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES TO
ACCEPT FELONY GUILTY PLEAS
The duty to accept felony guilty pleas is frequently assigned
to magistrate judges in several circuits, but has been challenged
as a nonassignable duty, even with the parties' consent.1 36 Courts
are in agreement that magistrate judges may conduct plea collo-
quies, but the ability of magistrate judges to formally accept
guilty pleas remains the subject of a split among the circuits. The
Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, but three circuits have
ruled that magistrate judges may accept guilty pleas, while one
circuit has held that this power is unavailable to magistrate
judges under the FMA.137 This Part first describes the procedure
for taking and formally accepting guilty pleas. It then explores
the reasoning of courts on each side of the split, before finally con-
sidering the positions of circuits that have not yet taken a clear
position on the issue.
A. Plea Procedure and Plea Acceptance
The procedures for taking guilty pleas, for both felonies and
misdemeanors, are very formalized.13 The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) state that the court must determine
that the plea is being entered knowingly and voluntarily and
"that there is a factual basis for the plea" prior to accepting the
135 See id at 888-89 (noting that "the acceptance of the guilty plea is quite similar in
importance to the conducting of a felony trial," the latter of which only Article III judges
are permitted to undertake).
136 Preliminarily, this issue's appealability may seem questionable given the parties'
consent. Generally, issues not raised in a lower court are waived and cannot be grounds
for appeal even if they were erroneously decided. However, "when a federal judge ... per-
forms an act of consequence that Congress has not authorized, reversal . . . may be appro-
priate even if the defendant has waived the issue or otherwise consented, even if the judge
has done a superb job on the merits and even if the defendant cannot show prejudice."
United States v Harden, 758 F3d 886, 890-91 (7th Cir 2014), citing Rivera v Illinois, 556
US 148, 161 (2009), and Nguyen v United States, 539 US 69, 73-81 (2003).
137 Cases approving magistrate judges' ability to accept guilty pleas include United
States v Ciapponi, 77 F3d 1247, 1251-52 (10th Cir 1996), United States v Woodard, 387
F3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir 2004) (per curiam), and United States v Benton, 523 F3d 424,
433 (4th Cir 2008). The sole circuit to explicitly deny this power to magistrate judges is
the Seventh Circuit. See Harden, 758 F3d at 889.
138 See United States v Reyna-Tapia, 328 F3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir 2003) (en banc)
(describing plea proceedings as "highly structured event[s] that follow[ ] a familiar script
and [are] governed by the specific terms of Rule 11").
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plea.139 FRCrP 11(b)(1) requires that, to make these determina-
tions, "the court must address the defendant personally in open
court" to "inform the defendant of, and determine that the defen-
dant understands," his rights and how they will be affected by his
plea.40 While this stage, known as the plea colloquy, has been
criticized as "a carefully rehearsed charade during which the par-
ticipants merely enact a script"141 that "lack[s] real significance as
[a] decisionmaking process[],"142 judges do sometimes reject
guilty pleas following colloquies due to perceived deficiencies in
defendants' responses. 143 All circuits that have addressed the is-
sue have affirmed that magistrate judges may perform plea collo-
quies and recommend dispositions to district judges.14
Performing the plea colloquy is distinct from accepting a
guilty plea, however, because the formal acceptance of a guilty
plea has legal consequences. 145 Before the court formally accepts
a guilty plea, a defendant may freely withdraw the plea for "any
reason or no reason."146 After a guilty plea is accepted but prior to
sentencing, the plea can be withdrawn only for a "fair and just
reason," as determined by the court, or upon the court's rejection
of a plea agreement.147 Thus, whether a magistrate judge may ac-
tually accept a guilty plea, or may only perform the plea colloquy
and recommend a disposition to the district judge, affects a de-
fendant's substantive rights following a plea colloquy with the
magistrate judge. While the district court retains the right to re-
view the magistrate judge's determinations de novo, this standard
of review does not effectively undo the legal implications of plea
139 FRCrP 11(b)(1)-(3).
140 FRCrP 11(b)(1).
141 Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Cri-
sis of Criminal Procedure, 49 Stan L Rev 547, 552 (1997).
142 Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 Ga L Rev 407,
460 (2008).
143 See, for example, United States v Chiapetta, 2003 WL 22071478, *3 (ND Ill) ("A
plea colloquy was held. However, after the government presented the factual basis for the
plea, defendant disagreed with facts essential for her guilt and the guilty plea was not
accepted."); Evans v Britton, 639 F2d 221, 222 (5th Cir 1981) (per curiam) (describing the
trial court's refusal to accept the defendants' guilty pleas); United States v James, 210 F3d
1342, 1346 (11th Cir 2000) (per curiam) (explaining that the colloquy was deficient and
"that James [neither] knew [n]or understood the elements comprising the charge").
144 See Parts II.B-D.
145 See Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238, 242 (1969) ("A plea of guilty is more than a
confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing
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acceptance. De novo review of plea acceptance will still require
the judge to uncover a reason why the plea should not have been
accepted, while a defendant would not have to provide any reason
for plea withdrawal if the plea had not yet been accepted. Thus,
for a defendant wishing to withdraw a plea for a reason the court
does not consider "fair and just," such as simple regret, the differ-
ence in standard may determine whether the case proceeds to
trial or simply proceeds to sentencing. The circuits have split on
this narrow but important issue.
B. The Majority View: Magistrate Judges Can Accept Guilty
Pleas
The Tenth Circuit was the first circuit to address magistrate
judges' authority to accept felony guilty pleas. In United States v
Ciapponi,148 George Ciapponi pleaded guilty to felony marijuana
possession with intent to distribute.149 Prior to beginning plea pro-
ceedings, Ciapponi was informed by a magistrate judge that he
had the right to appear before a district judge to enter his plea.11
Ciapponi then explicitly consented to proceeding before a magis-
trate judge and did not attempt to withdraw his plea or object to
the proceedings before the magistrate judge until appeal.151 The
appeals court held that magistrate judges could accept guilty
pleas "so long as a defendant's right to demand an Article III
judge is preserved."i52 In reaching this conclusion, the court im-
plicitly decided that accepting felony guilty pleas with defendants'
consent bore "some reasonable relation to the specified duties
which may be assigned to magistrate judges under the Magistrates
Act."153 However, rather than directly comparing it with any of the
duties directly specified in the FMA, the court made an indirect
comparison to these duties, as it focused on the importance of pre-
siding over voir dire, the delegation of which the Supreme Court
had already held to be permissible with the parties' consent under
the FMA in Peretz.154
148 77 F3d 1247 (10th Cir 1996).
149 Id at 1249.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Ciapponi, 77 F3d at 1251-52.
153 Id at 1250.
154 Id at 1251. Interestingly, the court also relied on a Second Circuit decision it de-
scribed as "address[ing] the question of a magistrate judge's authority to accept a guilty
plea." Id, citing United States v Williams, 23 F3d 629, 632-35 (2d Cir 1994). However, as
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The Eleventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in United
States v Woodard55 after reviewing a similar procedural history,
in which David Woodard explicitly consented to the role of the
magistrate judge and did not seek to withdraw his plea until after
sentencing.156 The court held that conducting a plea colloquy and
accepting a guilty plea "is 'less complex' than several of the duties
the FMA expressly authorizes magistrate judges to perform" and
thus that a magistrate judge is empowered to do so under the
Additional Duties Clause.157 In finding that "conducting a Rule 11
proceeding is comparable to the FMA's enumerated duties," the
Eleventh Circuit specifically mentioned the power "to conduct en-
tire civil and misdemeanor trials if the parties have consented[,]
... to hear and determine pretrial matters, to conduct evidentiary
hearings, and to submit to the district court proposed findings of
fact and recommendations for disposition."158 The court seems not
to have separately considered the plea colloquy and plea ac-
ceptance in deciding Woodard, as it claimed to be "join[ing] every
circuit to have examined th[is] issue[]," despite the fact that
many of the cited circuits considered only plea colloquy, not plea
acceptance. 1 9 The language the court used in deciding the case
also suggests no analytical differentiation between plea collo-
quy and plea acceptance, as the court noted that the defendant
challenged the magistrate judge's authority "to accept his guilty
plea and adjudicate him guilty of a felony" but held only that
"the FMA authorizes a magistrate judge ... to conduct Rule 11
proceedings."160
The final circuit to approve a magistrate judge's felony plea
acceptance is the Fourth Circuit in United States v Benton.161 Like
the defendants in Woodard and Ciapponi, Cedric Benton explic-
itly consented to pleading before a magistrate judge.162 Prior to
sentencing, however, Benton moved to withdraw his plea.163 The
district court found no "fair and just reason" for the withdrawal
discussed below, the Second Circuit case relied on actually dealt only with a plea colloquy,
not plea acceptance. See notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
155 387 F3d 1329 (11th Cir 2004) (per curiam).
156 Id at 1330-31.
157 Id at 1332-33.
158 Id.
159 Woodard, 387 F3d at 1331.
160 Id (emphasis added).
161 523 F3d 424, 426 (4th Cir 2008).
162 Id.
163 Id at 427. The motion to withdraw his plea followed a change in counsel and was
filed before Benton appeared at the sentencing hearing. Id.
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and therefore denied the motion.164 Benton argued on appeal that
he should have been permitted to withdraw his plea for any rea-
son, because the magistrate judge was not authorized to accept a
felony guilty plea.165 The appeals court, however, determined that
it was not error for the magistrate judge to accept the guilty plea,
arguing that "plea acceptance involves none of the complexity and
requires far less discretion than that necessary to perform many
tasks unquestionably within a magistrate judge's authority, such
as conducting felony voir dire and presiding over entire civil and
misdemeanor trials."166
Across these cases, the circuits relied on judgments regarding
the relative importance and complexity of plea colloquy and ac-
ceptance as compared to other tasks that may permissibly be del-
egated to magistrate judges, ultimately finding that these tasks
were comparable to the enumerated tasks.167 In making this as-
sessment, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits repeatedly blurred the
distinction between the plea colloquy and plea acceptance.168 Both
of these opinions routinely slip back and forth between these
terms when discussing the issues, and both opinions regularly
cite cases from other circuits that resolved only the plea colloquy
question as supporting the position that magistrate judges may
accept guilty pleas.16 It is unclear, then, if either of these circuits
considered the possibility that a magistrate judge might be em-
powered to conduct a plea colloquy but not to formally accept the
guilty plea.
164 Id. Prior to finding that there was no fair and just reason for withdrawal, "[t]he
district court reviewed the proceedings before the magistrate judge." Id. The standard ap-
plied at this stage was presumably de novo review, given that, as noted by the Fourth
Circuit, "district judges retain the authority to review the magistrate judge's actions de
novo." Id at 429. Thus, the district court judge presumably found no reversible errors in
the plea proceeding. However, as noted above, had the plea not yet been accepted when
the motion to withdraw was filed, the defendant would have had an absolute right to with-
draw the plea even in the absence of any error in the proceedings. See notes 145-47 and
accompanying text.
165 Benton, 523 F3d at 427-28.
166 Id at 432.
167 See id; Woodard, 387 F3d at 1332-33; Ciapponi, 77 F3d at 1250-51.
168 See, for example, Ciapponi, 77 F3d at 1251 (stating the holding that "the broad
residuary 'additional duties' clause of the Magistrates Act authorizes a magistrate judge
to conduct a Rule 11 felony plea proceeding"); Woodard, 387 F3d at 1332 (referencing the
fact that "a plea colloquy, while important, is 'less complex' than several of the duties the
FMA expressly authorizes magistrate judges to perform").
169 See, for example, Ciapponi, 77 F3d at 1251 (describing Williams as a case that
"addressed the question of a magistrate judge's authority to accept a guilty plea," when
Williams addressed only plea colloquies).
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The Fourth Circuit in Benton did, however, separate plea col-
loquy from plea acceptance in its discussion.170 The opinion de-
scribed plea acceptance as "merely the natural culmination of a
plea colloquy" and ultimately rejected the argument that "a mag-
istrate's acceptance of a plea should be considered different from
his conducting a plea colloquy."171 In part, the desire to treat these
two duties identically came from "the practical drawbacks of
adopting" a rule that magistrate judges may perform plea pro-
ceedings but not accept guilty pleas, including that such a rule
would "grant defendants a dry run or dress rehearsal."172 The
court expressed concern that such a procedure "risks rendering
plea proceedings before magistrate judges meaningless."173
C. The Seventh Circuit's Position: Magistrate Judges Cannot
Accept Guilty Pleas
The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit to determine that mag-
istrate judges may not accept guilty pleas, as it instead treats plea
colloquy and plea acceptance as distinct. In United States v
Harden,174 the Seventh Circuit broke from its sister circuits to
hold that even with the consent of the parties, magistrate judges
may not accept felony guilty pleas.175
As the appellants did in the cases described in Part II.B,
Stacy Harden explicitly consented to the magistrate judge accept-
ing the guilty plea.176 On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit
ruled this consent insufficient.177 The court concluded that accept-
ing a felony guilty plea is "quite similar in importance to the con-
ducting of a felony trial," given that "[o]nce a defendant's guilty
plea is accepted, the prosecution is at the same stage as if a jury
had just returned a verdict of guilty after a trial."178 Because there
is broad agreement that magistrate judges may not conduct fel-
ony trials under the FMA, the court concluded that accepting fel-
ony guilty pleas is also beyond the powers of a magistrate judge.179
The fact that "acceptance of a guilty plea is dispositive" and that
170 See Benton, 523 F3d at 431-33.
171 Id at 431.
172 Id at 432.
173 Id.
174 758 F3d 886 (7th Cir 2014).
175 Id at 891.
176 Id at 887.
177 Id at 891.
178 Harden, 758 F3d at 889.
179 Id.
2017] 929
The University of Chicago Law Review
it "results in a final and consequential shift in the defendant's
status" also made it clearly distinguishable from voir dire, accord-
ing to the court.1 80
The court recognized that allowing magistrate judges to ac-
cept guilty pleas would promote efficiency.181 However, this alone
was insufficient to convince the court that such power should be
granted. The court reasoned that Congress did not intend to
choose efficiency of the judicial system over all other values.182 The
courts would at least need "explicit authorization from Congress"
to delegate something as important as felony guilty plea ac-
ceptance, according to the Seventh Circuit.183
D. Circuits Addressing Plea Colloquies, but Not Plea
Acceptance
Four circuits have addressed the power of magistrate judges
to perform plea colloquies without considering whether magis-
trate judges may accept guilty pleas.184 In all of these cases, the
courts upheld the legitimacy of magistrate judges conducting plea
colloquies.185 However, the reasoning used to come to these deci-
sions and the rhetoric surrounding both plea colloquies and plea
acceptances illuminate the positions these courts would likely
take were the question of plea acceptances to come before them.
The Second Circuit first considered the question of plea collo-
quies in United States v Williams.186 Lloyd Williams consented to
the referral of his guilty plea (for conspiracy to import heroin) "to
a magistrate judge for the purposes of administering the allocu-
tion pursuant to [FRCrP] 11, making a finding as to whether the
plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and recommending
to the district court whether the plea should be accepted."187 The
magistrate judge "found a factual basis for the plea and recom-
mended to the district court that it be accepted."188 Upon learn-
ing that one of his contacts had been a government informant,
180 Id.
181 Id at 891.
182 Harden, 758 F3d at 891.
183 Id.
184 The leading four cases are Williams; United States v Dees, 125 F3d 261 (5th Cir
1997); United States v Torres, 258 F3d 791 (8th Cir 2001); and Reyna-Tapia.
185 See Williams, 23 F3d at 630; Dees, 125 F3d at 262-63; Torres, 258 F3d at 796;
Reyna-Tapia, 328 F3d at 1116.
186 23 F3d 629 (2d Cir 1994).
187 Id at 631.
188 Id.
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Williams's counsel made an oral motion (apparently at the sen-
tencing hearing) to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial
in order to allow him to pursue an entrapment defense.189 The dis-
trict judge concluded that there was "no basis for the application"
and refused.190 On appeal, the court relied on Gomez and Peretz to
hold that a magistrate judge could conduct a plea colloquy with
the defendant's consent. 191 Specifically, the court reasoned that
the duties associated with "the conduct of civil and misdemeanor
trials" are "comparable in responsibility and importance to ad-
ministering a Rule 11 felony allocution."192
Throughout Williams, much as in Ciapponi and Woodard, the
court regularly vacillated between referencing "plea allocution"
(another term for plea colloquy) and referencing plea ac-
ceptance.1 93 This case could be read to support later decisions that
the two are inseparable and should not be considered differently.
Indeed, the opinion does not even clearly articulate at what point
Williams's plea was legally accepted or by whom. However, be-
cause the referral to the magistrate judge empowered her only to
"recommend[ ] to the district court whether the plea should be ac-
cepted," it seems that the district court was responsible for actu-
ally accepting the plea.194 Any statements in the case about plea
acceptance by magistrate judges, then, are better understood as
referring to the process of plea colloquy rather than to formal plea
acceptance. Alternatively, these statements could simply be un-
derstood as dicta. Either way, the Second Circuit provides at best
ambiguous support for the position that magistrate judges may
formally accept felony guilty pleas.
The Fifth Circuit addressed plea colloquies in United States
v Dees.195 After Janet Dees consented to having a magistrate judge
take her plea, the magistrate judge performed the colloquy and
recommended that the district judge accept the plea.196 The dis-
trict court proceeded to accept the plea and sentence Dees.197 Dees
appealed on the basis that her sentence was miscalculated, and
189 See id.
190 Williams, 23 F3d at 631.
191 Id at 632-34.
192 Id at 633.
193 See, for example, id at 630-31 (characterizing the defendant's "principal conten-
tion" as "that the magistrate judge lacked authority to accept his plea," although the mag-
istrate judge in fact only recommended acceptance after performing the colloquy).
194 Williams, 23 F3d at 631.
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at no time raised any challenges to the magistrate judge's author-
ity to conduct her plea allocution.198 Nonetheless, the appeals
court raised the issue sua sponte, as a potential jurisdictional
challenge.199 Ultimately, the court determined that "plea proceed-
ings bear a close relationship" to other duties assignable to mag-
istrate judges, such as pretrial evidentiary hearings assignable
under § 636(b)(1).200 Additionally, the court emphasized that
"[b]ecause the district court retained full authority to review and
reject the magistrate judge's recommendation, the delegation did
not exceed the scope of magisterial authority contemplated by the
Act."201 The court observed that "[t]he taking of a plea by a mag-
istrate judge does not bind the district court to accept the plea"
and therefore found no threat to Article III's structural guaran-
tees. 202 While the opinion does not extensively discuss plea ac-
ceptance, the reference to the nonbinding nature of the magis-
trate judge's activities suggests that the separation between
plea colloquy and plea acceptance was relevant to the outcome
of the case.
The Eighth Circuit heard a challenge to the magistrate
judge's performance of a plea colloquy in United States v Torres.203
Jaime Torres consented to the conduct of his plea colloquy by a
magistrate judge, who then prepared a report and recommenda-
tion for the district judge, who accepted the guilty plea.204 Torres
did not attempt to withdraw his plea or challenge the jurisdiction
of the magistrate judge prior to his appeal.205 On appeal, the court
held that it was permissible for a magistrate judge to conduct the
plea colloquy with the consent of the defendant.206 In reaching this
conclusion, the court "agree[d] with the reasoning of the Second
and Fifth Circuits" in Williams and Dees.207 In the Eighth Circuit's
discussion of these cases' precedential value, the two-step process
of a magistrate judge submitting a report, followed by a district
court's "de novo review of the magistrate judge's recommenda-
tion," appeared to influence the outcome, because it was "precisely
198 Id.
199 Dees, 125 F3d at 263.
200 Id at 265.
201 Id.
202 Id at 268.
203 258 F3d 791, 793 (8th Cir 2001).
204 Id.
205 Id at 794.
206 Id at 796.
207 Torres, 258 F3d at 796.
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the procedure authorized by Williams and Dees."208 When magis-
trate judges are given the power to accept guilty pleas, the second
step of the process is eliminated, as the district court judge is no
longer involved in the final plea acceptance. Thus, the importance
of the two-step process in the Torres opinion suggests that the
Eighth Circuit might not permit magistrate judges to formally ac-
cept guilty pleas.209
When the Ninth Circuit addressed a magistrate judge's per-
formance of a plea colloquy in United States v Reyna-Tapia,210 it
was influenced by Ninth Circuit decisions on related issues. In
United States v Washman2l and United States v Alvarez-
Tautimez,212 the Ninth Circuit held that a magistrate judge's rec-
ommendation to a district court judge that a guilty plea be ac-
cepted was not a legally effective acceptance of a guilty plea.213
Therefore, between the plea colloquy in front of a magistrate
judge and the acceptance of the plea by a district judge, the de-
fendants in these cases maintained an "absolute right to with-
draw" their pleas, for any or no reason. 214
In Reyna-Tapia, the defendant consented to his plea being
taken by a magistrate judge, and a magistrate judge conducted
the plea colloquy and recommended that the guilty plea be ac-
cepted.215 "After the expiration of the time to file objections" to this
recommendation, and with no objections having been filed, the
district judge issued an order accepting the plea.216 After this or-
der was issued, but prior to sentencing, Jose Reyna-Tapia moved
to withdraw his plea.217 However, finding no fair and just reason
for the withdrawal, the district judge denied the motion and pro-
ceeded to sentencing.218 On appeal, the court held that district
court judges may accept the findings and recommendations of
magistrate judges without conducting de novo review when no ob-
jections have been filed.219 In reaching this conclusion, the court
208 Id.
209 For more on the practical importance of this distinction, see Part III.C.
210 328 F3d 1114 (9th Cir 2003) (en banc).
211 66 F3d 210 (9th Cir 1995).
212 160 F3d 573 (9th Cir 1998).
213 See Washman, 66 F3d at 212; Alvarez-Tautimez, 160 F3d at 575-76.
214 Alvarez-Tautimez, 160 F3d at 576. See also Washman, 66 F3d at 213.
215 Reyna-Tapia, 328 F3d at 1116.
216 Id.
217 Id at 1117.
218 See id.
219 Reyna-Tapia, 328 F3d at 1121-22.
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first noted that plea colloquies bore relevant similarities to pro-
ceedings magistrate judges are specifically authorized to preside
over by the FMA, including evidentiary hearings on motions to
suppress a defendant's out-of-court statement and preliminary
hearings to determine probable cause.220 The court emphasized
that defendants are entitled to de novo review if they file any ob-
jections, and that furthermore "defendants have an absolute right
to withdraw guilty pleas taken by magistrate judges at any time
before they are accepted by the district court."221 The Ninth Circuit,
then, consistently separated plea colloquies from plea acceptance
in its opinion.222 Additionally, the court emphasized the role of
that separation as a safeguard that supports the ability of magis-
trate judges to conduct plea colloquies in the first place.223 This
safeguarding role suggests that if the Ninth Circuit were to col-
lapse plea colloquy and plea acceptance into one unit of analysis,
as some circuits in the majority have, it would conclude that mag-
istrate judges could not even perform plea colloquies. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit's logic is directly contrary to the logic of the major-
ity circuits.
Overall, the circuits that have not yet considered whether
magistrate judges may accept guilty pleas generally provide sup-
port to the Seventh Circuit's position that magistrate judges may
perform plea colloquies without also accepting guilty pleas. The
Fifth and Ninth Circuits both relied on the perceived procedural
protection provided by district judge review prior to plea ac-
ceptance in upholding magistrate judges' performance of plea col-
loquies.224 While the Eighth Circuit did not rely as explicitly on
the two-step process in reaching its conclusion, it nonetheless
seemed to be influenced by the nonbinding nature of the magis-
trate judge's recommendation.225 Thus, among these circuits, only
the Second Circuit's opinion in Williams supports the proposition
220 Id at 1120-21.
221 Id at 1121.
222 See, for example, id.
223 See Reyna-Tapia, 328 F3d at 1121 ("Our conclusion is further supported by [the]
procedural safeguards inhering within existing practice [of permitting magistrates to con-
duct plea colloquies but not to accept guilty pleas].").
224 See Dees, 125 F3d at 268 (emphasizing that the recommendation of a magistrate
judge "does not bind the district court to accept that plea"); Reyna-Tapia, 328 F3d at 1121.
225 See Torres, 258 F3d at 796.
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that magistrate judges may accept guilty pleas in addition to per-
forming plea colloquies.226 And as noted above, the Williams opin-
ion provides only ambiguous support for this proposition.
III. THE ROLE OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES IN GUILTY PLEAS
Delegations to magistrate judges through the Additional
Duties Clause can be challenged on constitutional or statutory
grounds. However, given the Supreme Court's statements regard-
ing previous delegations that occurred with the parties' consent, 227
the constitutional grounds are unlikely to present a clear solution,
as further explained in Section A. This Comment, then, focuses
on statutory interpretation, such that the question reduces to the
relative importance of criminal procedures, a question addressed
by Section B. This Section argues that courts should try to ascer-
tain congressional views of the relative importance of duties po-
tentially delegable to magistrate judges when analyzing the
proper scope of the Additional Duties Clause, and that the FRCrP
provide valuable guidance on these congressional views. Finally,
it concludes that an analysis of the FRCrP as applied to felony
guilty plea acceptance reveals that Congress considers this duty
significantly more important than any of the enumerated duties
in 28 USC § 636. Therefore, this duty is not delegable under the
Additional Duties Clause, even with defendant consent. This ap-
proach proves particularly useful because it allows objective
analysis of the proper scope of the Additional Duties Clause.
A. Constitutional Arguments Are Unlikely to Resolve the Issue
Any constitutional challenge to a magistrate judge's power to
accept guilty pleas would rest on the inability of consent to cure
all constitutional issues.228 Defendants may waive their "per-
sonal" protections, even of fundamental constitutional rights such
as the right to trial, right to a jury, and right to be free of unrea-
sonable searches.229 However, individuals may not waive struc-
tural protections, as those are intended to protect society as a
226 See Williams, 23 F3d at 630.
227 See, for example, Peretz, 501 US at 937 (stating that the Court was "convinced that
no [] structural protections are implicated by the procedure followed" in allowing a mag-
istrate judge to conduct jury selection in a felony trial with the parties' consent).
228 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Schor, 478 US 833, 850-51 (1986)
("To the extent that [a] structural principle is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot
by consent cure the constitutional difficulty.").
229 Peretz, 501 US at 936-37.
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whole.230 Individual litigants are unlikely to sufficiently weigh the
long-term implications of altering the balance of power between
branches, and thus are not permitted to effect such changes
through their consent. 231
The Supreme Court appears unsympathetic to arguments
based on structural concerns related to the FMA.232 The Court has
acknowledged that magistrate judges are not Article III judges
but has highlighted that magistrate judges are supervised by Ar-
ticle III judges, lessening structural concerns.233 Additionally,
plea acceptance is not referred to magistrate judges without the
consent of district judges, and district judges retain the right to
review all magistrate judge decisions de novo.2 34 These limits
caused the Court to deny that the FMA creates structural prob-
lems, leading the parties' consent to be dispositive.235
Therefore, while there might be a delegation the Court would
strike down on constitutional grounds, the existing jurisprudence
makes it difficult to predict what such a delegation would entail.
Additionally, the principle of constitutional avoidance ensures
that if a delegation can be struck down on statutory grounds, the
Court will rely on that logic rather than tackling the constitu-
tional questions.236 Future reliance on constitutional avoidance in
interpreting the Additional Duties Clause is particularly likely
given that the Court has previously justified its interpretations of
the clause in this way.237 Thus, the statutory issues are a more
fruitful focus of analysis.238
230 Schor, 478 US at 851 ("When these Article III limitations are at issue, notions of
consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations service institutional in-
terests that the parties cannot be expected to protect.").
231 See id at 850-51.
232 See, for example, Peretz, 501 US at 937 ("Because the entire process takes place
under the district court's total control and jurisdiction, there is no danger that use of the
magistrate involves a congressional attempt to transfer jurisdiction to non-Article III tri-
bunals for the purpose of emasculating constitutional courts.") (quotation marks, citation,
and brackets omitted).
233 See id.
234 Id. Reviewing plea acceptance de novo is not the equivalent of simply denying to
magistrates the power to accept guilty pleas. See text accompanying note 147.
235 See Peretz, 501 US at 937.
236 See Gomez, 490 US at 864 ("It is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a
federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpre-
tation poses no constitutional question.").
237 See text accompanying notes 118-19.
238 Despite the apparent reluctance of the Supreme Court to review FMA issues as
constitutional issues, at least two recent pieces of legal scholarship have approached the
circuit split through a constitutional lens. See Anna Gotfryd, Note, The Safeguards of the
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B. Statutory Interpretation Suggests Magistrate Judges
Cannot Accept Felony Guilty Pleas
In considering whether felony guilty plea acceptance is dele-
gable to magistrate judges, the circuits have compared the im-
portance of, complexity of, and discretion required for guilty plea
acceptance to those of the duties enumerated in the FMA.239 This
approach is based on the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, which
used a similar methodology in Mathews,240 Gomez,24 Peretz,242 and
Gonzalez v United States.24
In applying this test, the animating disagreements do not fo-
cus on either what a magistrate judge must determine before ac-
cepting a guilty plea or the legal effect that acceptance has on the
defendant. Indeed, such disagreement is unlikely because these
legal standards are established by FRCrP 11.244 Instead, the cases
rely on subjective assessments of the importance of plea ac-
ceptance. 245 The apparent source of these judgments has been
Constitution: Fundamental Rights Not Disposable Gifts, 2016 U Ill L Rev 627, 667-71 (ar-
guing that, in addition to being generally too important to fall within the Additional Duties
Clause, plea acceptance is reserved for Article III judges as a structural protection in the
Constitution, rather than a personal right); Andrew Chesley, Note, The Scope of United
States Magistrate Judge Authority after Stern v. Marshall, 116 Colum L Rev 757, 758-59
(2016) (describing "the primary legal challenge to the exercise of particular additional du-
ties" such as accepting guilty pleas as "most often [being] that the duty the magistrate
judge is attempting to execute is one that is reserved for Article III judges," and ultimately
concluding that magistrate judge authority is "less troubling under Article III" than bank-
ruptcy judge authority and thus is likely constitutional). While the authors make compel-
ling arguments, the Supreme Court is unlikely to seriously engage with any of them with-
out a drastic change in membership, given that, among the sitting justices, only Justice
Clarence Thomas has appeared sympathetic to constitutional arguments on this issue. See
Gonzalez v United States, 553 US 242, 265-69 (2008) (Thomas dissenting) (addressing the
"serious constitutional questions" presented by the Court's interpretation of the FMA and
criticizing the majority for giving the constitutional questions "short shrift"):
239 See Parts I.B-D.
240 Mathews, 423 US at 270-71.
241 Gomez, 490 US at 865-71.
242 Peretz, 501 US at 927-32.
243 553 US 242, 252 (2008).
244 One could also imagine factual disputes regarding the practical effect of allowing
magistrate judges to accept guilty pleas, and these factual questions are addressed in
depth in Part III.C. For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that these prac-
tical questions do not seem to underlie the opinions.
245 Compare Benton, 523 F3d at 433 ("[A]cceptance of a plea is a duty that does not
exceed the responsibility and importance of the more complex tasks a magistrate is explic-
itly authorized to perform."), with Harden, 758 F3d at 888 ("The task of accepting a guilty
plea is a task too important to be considered a mere 'additional duty' permitted under
§ 636(b)(3): it is more important than the supervision of a civil or misdemeanor trial, or
presiding over voir dire.").
The University of Chicago Law Review
each judge's individual subjective assessment, as none of the opin-
ions indicated that the decisions were based on the importance
assigned to this function by any other body.
In light of related Supreme Court jurisprudence, this ap-
proach is incomplete, as statutory interpretation should consider
congressional intent. For the Additional Duties Clause, the rele-
vant consideration is the congressional perspective on the im-
portance of various duties. While the FMA itself provides limited
insight into this question,246 FRCrP 11 suggests that Congress
views accepting felony guilty pleas as a distinctively important
duty, such that it is not delegable to magistrate judges under the
Additional Duties Clause. Following this approach has the addi-
tional advantage of producing more valuable guidance for district
courts regarding the scope of assignable duties moving forward,
as the objective inquiry into congressional intent allows more pre-
dictable outcomes.
1. The FRCrP provide information about congressional
views of the relative importance of criminal procedures.
When the text of a statute is ambiguous, one goal of statutory
interpretation is to give effect to congressional intent, and "other
statutes on the same subject" may illuminate such intent.247 In
the context of the Additional Duties Clause, the Supreme Court
affirmed this approach by repeatedly describing the key issue as
whether Congress intended the duty at issue to be within the
magistrate judges' power. 248 Importantly, discerning congres-
sional intent about the assignability of particular duties requires
more than understanding that Congress intends less important
duties to be delegable and more important duties to be nondele-
gable. Instead, the second-order consideration of how much im-
portance Congress attributes to the duties is dispositive. There-
fore, courts should attempt to discern congressional intent, rather
than making their own assessments of the importance of these
duties. Notably, neither courts nor commentators have looked be-
yond the text of the FMA itself for congressional guidance on this
246 See Part I.B.
247 North Haven Board of Education v Bell, 456 US 512, 555 (1982) (Powell dissenting).
248 For a lengthy discussion of the legislative history and goals of the FMA, see
Mathews, 423 US at 266-72. See also Gomez, 490 US at 875-76 (stating in the decisive
resolution of the issue that the Court was persuaded "that Congress did not intend the
additional duties clause to embrace this function").
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question.249 However, the FRCrP provide valuable information re-
garding congressional views of the importance of criminal proce-
dures, which has thus far been ignored.
The FRCrP were originally enacted "in 1944 following the
successful implementation of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure" (FRCP).250 The current iteration of the FRCrP is authorized
by the 1988 Rules Enabling Act.251 This act empowers the judiciary
to propose procedural rules, but Congress retains ultimate re-
sponsibility for the content of the rules, as it is entitled to reject
proposed FRCrP amendments or to enact its own amendments
independent of the judiciary.22 This oversight is enabled by 28
USC § 2074(a), requiring the Supreme Court to give Congress at
least seven months' notice before any proposed rule change is to
take effect.23
Beyond formal oversight, Congress demonstrated that the
FRCrP reflect its will by actively participating in the rulemaking
process. While most judicial proposals are accepted without
amendment, they have not been universally accepted. For exam-
ple, in 1974, Congress delayed implementation of proposed
amendments to the FRCrP to permit time for congressional re-
view of the proposed changes.24 Following this delay, Congress
approved many of the changes, but it included several modifica-
tions to the Supreme Court's proposals, including additional
249 For example, one piece of recent scholarship addressing this split advocated look-
ing only to the text of the FMA to determine the scope of the Additional Duties Clause,
abandoning even the consent analysis introduced in Peretz, 501 US at 927-32, at least in
the context of felony guilty pleas. See generally Tomi Mendel, Note, Efficiency Run Amok:
Challenging the Authority of Magistrate Judges to Hear and Accept Felony Guilty Pleas,
68 Vand L Rev 1795 (2015). Despite focusing exclusively on the text of the FMA, the note's
solution is also oddly atextual, as it suggests that any "additional duties" must "fit neatly
into a category enumerated in the [FMA]," thus rendering the Additional Duties Clause a
superfluity. Id at 1830.
250 Jordan Gross, An Ounce of Pretrial Prevention Is Worth More Than a Pound of
Post-conviction Cure: Untethering Federal Pretrial Criminal Procedure from Due Process
Standards of Review, 18 Berkeley J Crim L 317, 324 (2013). See also Act of June 29, 1940,
54 Stat 688 (providing the initial authorization for the FRCrP).
251 Pub L No 100-702, 102 Stat 4648 (1988), codified as amended in various sections
of Title 28.
252 28 USC §§ 2072-74. Congress could also repeal the Rules Enabling Act altogether,
withdrawing the power of proposing rules from the judiciary, if it were sufficiently dissat-
isfied with the rules coming from the judicial branch.
253 Under this section, proposed rule changes must be transmitted to Congress no
later than May 1 of the year they are to take effect and may take effect no earlier than
December 1 "unless otherwise provided by law." 28 USC § 2074(a).
254 See Act of July 30, 1974, Pub L No 93-361, 88 Stat 397.
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amendments developed by Congress.255 Similarly, in 1994 Congress
approved "[t]he proposed amendments to the [FRCrP] which are
embraced by an order entered by the Supreme Court ... but with"
significant "amendments" to Rule 32.26 More recently, Congress
modified the amendments to Rule 16 proposed by the Supreme
Court in 2002,257 modified Rule 7 on its own initiative in 2003,258
and modified Rule 6 on its own initiative in 2004.259
With regard to guilty pleas, Congress modified the Supreme
Court's proposed amendments to Rule 11 in 1975.260 Congress also
delayed implementation of the Supreme Court's proposed amend-
ments to Rule 11 in 1979 to enable more extensive review.261 Of
note, the 1975 and 1979 amendments represented major steps in
the formalization of the plea colloquy and were nearly contem-
poraneous with major changes to the FMA in 1976 and 1979.
Congress also made a minor technical modification to Rule 11 in
1989 without a formal proposal of amendment from the Supreme
Court.262 Congress's history of direct involvement with Rule 11, of
delaying the implementation of amendments to other sections in
order to permit more extensive review, and of modifying proposals
made by the Supreme Court to amend other rules, strengthens
the presumption that the FRCrP accurately reflect congressional
will. Therefore, despite being largely drafted by the judiciary,
255 See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub L No 94-
64, 89 Stat 370. As noted in the House report on the bill that eventually implemented the
amendments, the amendments proposed by the judiciary "were [ ] numerous, diverse and
controversial." Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act, HR Rep No 94-247,
94th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1975). The House Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice held five days of hearings and "received comments about the proposed
amendments from all segments of the legal profession." Id at 3.
256 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 230101, Pub L No 103-
322, 108 Stat 1796, 2077-78 (amending sentencing procedures to require judges to deter-
mine whether the victim of "a crime of violence or sexual abuse ... wishes to make a state-
ment or present any information in relation to the sentence," among other amendments).
257 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act § 11019,
Pub L No 107-273, 116 Stat 1758, 1825-26 (2002) (amending the rules regarding pretrial
disclosure of expert testimony).
258 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003 § 610(b), Pub L No 108-21, 117 Stat 650, 692 (creating a procedure to allow in-
dictment of "an individual whose name is unknown, but who has a particular DNA profile").
259 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 6501, Pub L No 108-
458, 118 Stat 3638, 3760 (allowing government attorneys to disclose certain grand jury
matters involving national security threats).
260 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act § 3, 89 Stat at 371-72.
261 Act of July 31, 1979, Pub L No 96-42, 93 Stat 326.
262 Minor and Technical Criminal Law Amendments Act of 1988 § 7076, Pub L No
100-690, 102 Stat 4395, 4406.
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these rules provide a valuable source of insight into congressional
understanding of the importance of criminal procedures.
This presumption is further supported by courts' discussions
of congressional intent when interpreting other federal rules.263
For example, congressional intent is frequently invoked to inter-
pret the Federal Rules of Evidence,24 with Congress even devel-
oping "Statement[s] of Congressional Intent" regarding some
rules.265 Further, while "Congress has full power to statutorily su-
persede any or all of the Rules," courts construe new statutes "to
harmonize with" the federal rules "unless the congressional in-
tent to [supersede the rule] clearly appears,"266 an interpretive
rule consistent with a presumption that the rules reflect congres-
sional intent. That courts treat the federal rules like statutes for
this purpose2 7 supports the idea that the FRCrP can be used as a
guide to congressional understanding of the relative importance
of various aspects of criminal procedure.
Using the FRCrP as a guide to the importance of various as-
pects of criminal procedure when analyzing the scope of the FMA
has the benefit of allowing the judiciary to directly present pro-
posed amendments for congressional consideration. If the FRCrP
263 The various sets of federal rules (including, but not limited to, the FRCP, FRCrP,
and Federal Rules of Evidence) all have their authorizations in the current Rules Enabling
Act, although there are differences in their precise histories. Each set of rules was initially
developed by the courts, with varying degrees of intervention by Congress over the years.
For a detailed description of the rulemaking process, see generally Peter G. McCabe, Re-
newal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 Am U L Rev 1655 (1995). Thus, interpretive
rules governing one set of federal rules should generally be applicable to all of them.
264 See, for example, United States v Toney, 615 F2d 277, 279-80 (5th Cir 1980) (hold-
ing that "Congress meant what it said in [Federal Rule of Evidence] 609(a)(2)"); Complaint
of American Export Lines, Inc, 73 FRD 454, 457 (SDNY 1977) (reviewing the "historical
background" of Federal Rule of Evidence 803 to determine congressional intent).
265 See, for example, Addressing Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, S 2405, 110th
Cong, 2d Sess, in 154 Cong Rec 18015, 18016 (Sept 8, 2008) (statement of Rep Jackson-Lee)
(inserting a "Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence" into the Congressional Record).
266 Marx v General Revenue Corp, 668 F3d 1174, 1179 (10th Cir 2011), quoting United
States v Gustin-Bacon Division, Certainteed Products Corp, 426 F2d 539, 542 (10th Cir
1970). See also, for example, In re General Motors Corp Engine Interchange Litigation, 594
F2d 1106, 1134 n 50 (7th Cir 1979) ("[W]e think that the proper rule of construction is that
the Congressional intent to repeal a federal rule must be clearly expressed before the
courts will find such a repeal."); Grossman v Johnson, 674 F2d 115, 122-23 & n 14 (1st Cir
1982) (noting the similarity of this interpretive principle and "the canon against implied
repeals of statutes in the absence of clear intention to do so or repugnancy of the later to
the earlier legislation"); In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 589 F2d 786, 787 (5th Cir
1979) ("There can be no doubt that the privilege of confidentiality, now embodied in
Rule 26(c), . .. is a creation of Congress, just as are the [other FRCP].").
267 See Grossman, 674 F2d at 123 n 14.
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do not reflect the judiciary's views of the relative importance of
procedures, such that relying on the FRCrP to infer the scope of
the Additional Duties Clause restricts district judges' ability to
refer otherwise-appropriate matters to magistrate judges, the ju-
diciary can suggest modifications to the FRCrP that would rem-
edy these flaws. Congress would then have the issue squarely pre-
sented to it, and it could accept or reject the proposed changes to
clarify its position.
2. Congress has indicated the importance of guilty pleas by
requiring personal interrogation of the defendant in
FRCrP 11.
FRCrP 11 requires the court to "address the defendant per-
sonally in open court" to inform the defendant of his rights and
the charges against him, as well as to establish that the plea is
knowing, voluntary, and factually based.268 This requirement of
personal address is nearly unique within the FRCrP. Aside from
when accepting guilty pleas, the court is required to "address the
defendant personally" in only two other situations: first, "to per-
mit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate
the sentence" during sentencing,29 and second, to "advise each de-
fendant of the right to the effective assistance of counsel" when
joint representation is proposed.270 Although not explicit in the
FRCrP, a defendant must also personally waive the right to coun-
sel.271 Notably, while the direct-address requirement applies, on
its face, to both felonies and misdemeanors, FRCrP 43(b)(2) indi-
cates that the defendant's presence is not required at "arraign-
ment, plea, trial, [or] sentencing" in misdemeanor cases, so long
as the defendant has provided written consent for the proceeding
to occur in his absence.272 The full force of FRCrP 11, then, is re-




271 See New York v Hill, 528 US 110, 114 (2000) (listing the "right to counsel" as an
example of "certain fundamental rights" that can be waived only if "the defendant [ ] per-
sonally make[s] an informed waiver"). Because a defendant who is waiving the right to
counsel is unrepresented, it is difficult to imagine how else the defendant could waive this
right. See Gonzalez, 553 US at 255-56 (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (characterizing
the requirement for defendants to personally waive the right to counsel as "essentially sui
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The direct address of the defendant during a guilty plea sug-
gests congressional concern with protecting the defendant during
the plea process, even at the expense of efficiency. Personal ad-
dress of defendants may require additional resources (such as
translators) or time (spent explaining rights to defendants) rela-
tive to a colloquy with defendant's counsel, or a written and signed
plea agreement alone. For some decisions, such as the decision to
conduct voir dire before a magistrate judge, these efficiency con-
cerns are sufficient to allow judges to address defendants' counsel
rather than defendants.273 These efficiency concerns also appear
to animate the exception for misdemeanor pleas in
FRCrP 43(b)(2). Yet personal address is always required for fel-
ony guilty pleas, indicating the heightened seriousness of this
procedure. Indeed, the defendant's presence is not required at any
point during misdemeanor trials,274 but is required for felony
pleas, highlighting the supreme importance of felony pleas. This
level of importance in the FRCrP thus sets the duty of accepting
felony guilty pleas apart from the enumerated duties assignable
to magistrate judges under the FMA. Within the realm of crimi-
nal law, magistrate judges are permitted to conduct trials for mis-
demeanors and to enter sentences for misdemeanors with the par-
ties' consent. 275 While these are often described by courts as
complex and important duties,276 the defendant's presence is not
required for either proceeding under the FRCrP, in contrast to a
felony plea proceeding. An evaluation of the procedural protec-
tions of the FRCrP, then, suggests that Congress considers fel-
ony guilty pleas to be more important than any misdemeanor
proceedings.277
273 See Gonzalez, 553 US at 250 (concluding that because "requiring personal, on-
the-record approval from the client ... might distract from more pressing matters as the
attorney seeks to prepare the best defense . . . consent by counsel suffices to permit a
magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial").
274 See FRCrP 43(b)(2).
275 28 USC § 636(a)(3)-(5).
276 See, for example, Benton, 523 F3d at 432 (highlighting the "complexity" of "presid-
ing over entire . . . misdemeanor trials"); Woodard, 387 F3d at 1332-33 (same).
277 The enhanced level of importance attached to felony pleas relative to misdemeanor
trials is reasonable given that, by definition, felonies are more serious crimes that expose
defendants to heightened penalties. See 18 USC § 3559(a). Differences in the collateral
consequences of felonies and misdemeanors also reflect the difference in seriousness. For
example, felons are barred from serving on juries or carrying firearms, see 28 USC
§ 1865(b)(5); 18 USC § 922(g)(1), while most convicted of misdemeanors are not subject to
these penalties. Given these differences, it is reasonable for Congress to view a dispositive
procedure in a felony case as more important than any procedure in a misdemeanor case.
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Relatedly, a well-recognized limitation on magistrate judges'
power is that they may not conduct felony trials.278 FRCrP 43 con-
tains identical requirements for the defendant's presence at the
plea, sentencing, and "every trial stage."279 Thus, despite clearly
distinguishing the importance of misdemeanor proceedings from
the importance of all felony proceedings through varied require-
ments for the defendant's presence, the FRCrP do not similarly
suggest that felony trials are more important than felony guilty
pleas. It is apparent from FRCrP 43 alone, then, that felony guilty
pleas are more important than any misdemeanor proceedings.20
FRCrP 43 alone would be insufficient to distinguish felony
guilty pleas from jury impanelment, which the Supreme Court
held in Peretz and Gonzalez to be a duty assignable to magistrate
judges,281 as the presence of the defendant is required for both
procedures. However, FRCrP 11 (governing guilty pleas) and
FRCrP 24 (governing jury selection) reveal significant differences
in the roles of defendants in these two procedures. FRCrP 24
states that only "the [c]ourt" or "attorneys for the parties," rather
than the defendant, may "examine prospective jurors."282 Simi-
larly, while peremptory challenges are described as belonging to
the "defendants" themselves, rather than their attorneys, there
are no procedures requiring the defendants to directly exercise
these challenges.283 In contrast, FRCrP 11 requires direct address
of the defendant, and only the defendant may officially enter a
guilty plea.284 While one might argue that this difference is based
on the enhanced complexity of voir dire relative to pleading, this
is not how the Supreme Court in Gonzalez framed the choice be-
tween requiring personal waiver and allowing waiver by counsel.
Instead, in noting that "[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the
nature of the right at issue," the Court emphasized that "[flor cer-
tain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an
informed waiver."285 Similarly, while "the lawyer has-and must
278 See notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
279 FRCrP 43(a), (c). Again, while this requirement applies on its face to both felonies
and misdemeanors, FRCrP 43(b)(2) allows a misdemeanor defendant to waive it, reserving
FRCrP 43's force for felony trials alone.
280 This result makes sense, given that a defendant is in the same position following
the acceptance of a felony guilty plea as after a guilty verdict following trial. Harden, 758
F3d at 889.




285 Gonzalez, 553 US at 248, quoting Hill, 528 US at 114.
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have-full authority to manage the conduct of the trial" by mak-
ing all needed "tactical decisions," the attorney still cannot uni-
laterally waive certain "basic rights."26 This focus on the im-
portance of the underlying right at stake, rather than the
complexity of the decision, reflects an understanding of procedure
as geared toward protecting important rights, rather than single-
mindedly promoting efficiency.27 Thus, the Supreme Court's hold-
ings in Peretz and Gonzalez can also be reconciled with an approach
based on the FRCrP.
A potential objection to this analysis is that the direct-address
requirement emphasizes the importance of plea colloquy-a duty
universally recognized by courts as delegable-rather than plea
acceptance. While this objection is well taken, it is ultimately in-
correct. The plea colloquy itself is not inherently important; it is
important only as a safeguard for the defendant against the con-
sequences of the guilty plea. The plea colloquy is not undertaken
for its own sake, but instead is merely a step that must be taken
"[b]efore accepting a plea of guilty" and "[b]efore entering judg-
ment on a guilty plea."288 When a plea colloquy is conducted but
no plea is officially accepted, no change in the defendant's legal
rights or obligation has taken place. Until the plea is accepted,
the defendant has been convicted of no crime. Thus, empowering
magistrate judges to conduct plea colloquies does not enable them
to enter a legally binding disposition in a felony case; it instead
empowers them only to question the defendant and provide advice
to the ultimate decision-maker. If magistrate judges are empow-
ered to accept guilty pleas, however, their impressions will neces-
sarily be legally binding.
As noted above, prior to plea acceptance, defendants may with-
draw their pleas for any or no reason. After plea acceptance, a de-
fendant must show a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the
plea. This change in the substantive rule of decision means that de
novo review of the proceedings by the district judge is unable to
effectively undo the legal effect of a magistrate judge's acceptance
of a guilty plea.289 Even under de novo review, the defendant will
286 Gonzalez, 553 US at 248-50, quoting Hill, 528 US at 114-15.
287 It is true that the Court later discussed complexity in justifying why "tactical de-
cisions" can be made by lawyers alone. Gonzalez, 553 US at 247-51. However, the Court
reached this justification only after analyzing whether the right at issue is simply too im-
portant to be subject to attorney decision-making. See id.
288 FRCrP 11(b)(2)-(3).
289 Prior to formal acceptance, the defendant remains free to withdraw his plea for
any or no reason. After the court has accepted the plea, the defendant loses this right, and
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still be required to show a reason why the plea should be with-
drawn. Instead, requiring the district judge's affirmative ac-
ceptance as a second step before the plea becomes legally binding
better reflects the heightened level of importance of felony guilty
pleas indicated in the FRCrP.
C. Practical Implications of Denying Magistrate Judges the
Power to Accept Felony Guilty Pleas
While Sections A and B considered the formal basis for deny-
ing magistrate judges the power to accept felony guilty pleas, it is
worth also considering the practical implications of this argu-
ment, including both systemic efficiency losses and enhanced pro-
tection of individual rights. This Section argues first that the ef-
ficiency losses predicted in several courts' opinions are overstated.
Second, this Section argues that the potential enhancements of
individual rights have been underappreciated in discussions of
this issue.
1. Fears of severe efficiency losses from denying magistrate
judges the power to accept felony guilty pleas are likely
exaggerated.
A significant motivation for the enactment of the FMA, and
of the Additional Duties Clause, was to promote the efficient func-
tioning of the court system.290 Fears of efficiency losses seemingly
motivated decisions that permit magistrate judges to accept guilty
pleas. These concerns were most directly addressed in Benton, the
only case to explicitly address the difference between plea collo-
quies and plea acceptances and hold that magistrate judges may
perform both.291 The court argued that allowing magistrate judges
to perform plea colloquies but not plea acceptances would lead to
tremendous inefficiencies, including in many cases "a complete
waste of judicial resources."292 This argument was founded on the
suggestion that defendants might use their plea colloquies as
practice to determine how they feel after entering their guilty
pleas, later withdrawing their pleas before district judges could
accept them.293
may withdraw his plea only for a "fair and just reason," or if the court rejects his plea deal.
FRCrP 11(d).
290 Mathews, 423 US at 267.
291 Benton, 523 F3d at 432-34.
292 Id at 432.
293 Id at 433. This specific argument is addressed in more depth in Part I.B.
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Dire predictions seem unjustified, however, given the experi-
ence of circuits that separate the roles of plea colloquy and plea
acceptance. Fifth Circuit magistrate judges perform more guilty
plea proceedings than those in any other circuit (8,485 in the year
ending in September 2014),294 even though the Fifth Circuit has
not granted magistrate judges the authority to legally accept
guilty pleas, but instead has granted only the authority to per-
form plea colloquies.295 The next-highest circuit in volume of plea
proceedings conducted by magistrate judges, with 8,456,296 is the
Ninth, which has repeatedly held that magistrate judges' recom-
mendations following plea colloquies are not legally binding.297
That these circuits refer guilty plea proceedings to magistrate
judges in large numbers, while distinguishing between plea collo-
quy and plea acceptance, suggests that these circuits have not ex-
perienced such a separation as a waste of judicial resources.
The relative performance of districts within each circuit in
terms of time from filing to disposition provides an additional
point of reference in analyzing efficiency concerns. 298 In the year
ending June 30, 2015, 70,001 felony cases were filed in US district
courts.299 Nationwide, the median time from filing to disposition
of felonies was approximately 7.5 months.oo While the caseload
statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the US Courts
provide only median time from disposition to filing in each district,
making aggregate statistical analysis across circuits challenging,
some suggestive comparisons are still possible. Specifically, rank-
ing each district by time to disposition of felonies, and comparing
the mean rankings across circuits, provides a rough sense of the
relative performance across circuits. Notably, the three circuits
that permit magistrate judges to accept guilty pleas are also the
circuits that perform best in this analysis. Indeed, six of the top
294 Table M-4: U.S. District Courts-Criminal Pretrial Matters Handled by U.S. Mag-
istrate Judges under 28 U.S.C. 636(b) during the 12-Month Period Ending September 30,
2014 *2, archived at http://perma.cc/87SR-SDYA.
295 See Part IID.
296 Table M-4: U.S. District Courts-Criminal Pretrial Matters Handled by U.S. Mag-
istrate Judges at *3 (cited in note 294).
297 See Part IID.
298 While these data are not available in this form, for each district, the median time
from filing to disposition by type of case is available. See generally United States District
Courts-National Judicial Caseload Profile, archived at http://perma.cc/8E87-E65T. From
that information, the districts can be ranked, and an average rank for each circuit can be
calculated.
299 Id at *1.
300 Id.
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ten districts with the shortest median times are within these
three circuits, as are fourteen of the top twenty districts. This is
disproportionate representation from these circuits, given that
only approximately 28 percent of the nation's districts are within
these three circuits.301 This suggests that allowing magistrate
judges to accept felony guilty pleas may promote expeditious dis-
position of felony cases.
However, the limitations of this methodology, especially in
light of important possible confounding factors, such as the total
caseload per judge and the ratio of types of cases, suggest it is not
possible to draw a strong inference of causation from these data.302
For example, districts with an unusually high proportion of im-
migration cases also have unusually short median times from fil-
ing to disposition in felony cases,303 reflecting the possibility that
differences across circuits could be driven largely by factors other
than the ability of magistrate judges to accept guilty pleas. Addi-
tionally, it is noteworthy that the circuits permitting magistrate
judges to accept felony guilty pleas do not perform as well when
the same methodology is used to evaluate performance on civil
matter duration. While fully analyzing the reasons for this differ-
ence in performance between criminal and civil cases is beyond
the scope of this Comment, it seems at least plausible that there
is a trade-off between speedy disposition of criminal matters and
speedy disposition of civil matters. Thus, inefficiencies introduced
on the criminal side might nudge courts toward greater efficiency
on the civil side. For example, if courts find it inefficient to permit
magistrate judges to perform felony plea colloquies absent the
power to accept the pleas, perhaps courts will fill magistrate
judges' dockets with more civil matters that are clearly assignable
under the FMA. While the possibility of such an outcome is spec-
ulative, there is some evidence that procedural efficiency on one
301 The Fourth Circuit has nine districts, the Tenth Circuit has eight districts, and
the Eleventh Circuit has nine districts, for a total of twenty-six districts. The nation as a
whole has ninety-four. See generally id.
302 Indeed, no formal tests for statistical significance were performed, as the limita-
tions of this analysis are likely too great to render such tests meaningful.
303 The District of New Mexico, for example, had approximately 4,450 criminal felony
cases in 2015 (including criminal transfers), of which more than 3,450 (or over 75 percent)
were immigration cases, the highest proportion in the country. United States District
Courts-National Judicial Caseload Profile at *81 (cited in note 298). This district also
had the shortest median time from criminal felony filing to disposition, at one month. Id.
The other districts with over 50 percent immigration cases are the District of Arizona (4.9
months), the Southern District of Texas (5.1 months), and the Western District of Texas
(5.2 months). See id at *36-37, 65.
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side of the civil-criminal divide can be influenced by docket pres-
sures on the other side. For. example, one account of the rise of
plea bargaining suggests that judges' acceptance of plea bargain-
ing procedures was largely motivated by the need to reduce docket
pressure in the face of increasingly complex civil litigation.04
The overall impact on efficiency of denying magistrate judges
the power to accept felony guilty pleas is thus uncertain, and may
be minor. However, as is shown in the next Section, the potential
benefits to individual defendants are significant.
2. Denying magistrate judges the authority to accept felony
guilty pleas would enhance the protections afforded to
defendants.
Ideally, plea bargains are understood to provide a "mutuality
of advantage" to both the prosecution and the defense, enhancing
the efficiency of the criminal justice system while limiting risk to
the defendant.305 Furthermore, plea bargains are often under-
stood to be "inherent in the criminal law and its administration"
given the existence of charging and sentencing discretion.306 In-
deed, without guilty pleas, the system would quickly malfunction,
as it is unprepared to handle the volume of trials that would be
required.307
Despite their importance and possible inevitability, plea
bargains are frequently criticized as insufficiently protective of
individual rights.30s Some scholars have even suggested that the
plea bargaining process is inherently unconstitutional.309 With
over 97 percent of convictions resulting from guilty pleas,310
these criticisms have gained significant attention. In particular,
304 See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph: A History of Plea Bargaining in
America 116-24 (Stanford 2003).
305 Brady v United States, 397 US 742, 752 (1970).
306 Id at 751-52.
307 See Lindsey Devers, Plea and Change Bargaining: Research Summary *1 (Depart-
ment of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Jan 24, 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/Z6L3-XFSJ (concluding that 95 percent of cases disposed of in federal dis-
trict court ended in guilty pleas). See also Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 260 (1971) ("If
every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Govern-
ment would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.").
308 See generally, for example, Alexandra W. Reimelt, Note, An Unjust Bargain: Plea
Bargains and Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 51 BC L Rev 871 (2010).
309 See generally, for example, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83
Harv L Rev 1387 (1970).
310 See Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2011-Statistical Tables *17
(Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jan 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/LK2U-8LLR.
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plea colloquies are often characterized by leading, compound
questions, which are prohibited during direct examination at trial
due to concerns about their evidentiary value.311 The process has
also been criticized based on the flawed incentives provided to de-
fense attorneys 312 and the limited degree to which plea bargains
replicate likely trial outcomes. 13 The rules governing plea with-
drawal have also been criticized as "having an extensive, unjust,
and deleterious impact" on defendants.314 Time pressure in plead-
ing is also commonly criticized, as individuals under time pres-
sure are "less likely to engage in systematic information pro-
cessing."3'5 On a more basic level, a large number of "psychological
pitfalls" have been identified in the plea process.316 Even under
the best of circumstances, then, individual rights may be signifi-
cantly sacrificed during pleading.
Weaknesses in rights protection during the process are espe-
cially troubling for defendants who waive their right to perform a
plea colloquy before an Article III judge. The importance of in-
person cues for assessing the defendant's responses renders de
novo review of a plea colloquy difficult, much like the difficulty of
311 Julian A. Cook III, Federal Guilty Pleas under Rule 11: The Unfulfilled Promise of
the Post-Boykin Era, 77 Notre Dame L Rev 597, 615-28 (2002). See also, for example, State
v Raleigh, 778 NW2d 90, 94 (Minn 2010) (establishing the defendant's mens rea based on
his affirmative response to the question: "And just so we're clear here, [the beating] hap-
pened not only before you went out to look at the car, but that actually was what you had
in mind when you came back from the car, to finish [Porter] off?") (brackets in original).
312 See, for example, Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Conse-
quences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 Iowa L Rev 119, 140-
66 (2009) (describing how certain constitutional doctrines within the area of pleading,
when combined with other factors, incentivize judges and lawyers to stay silent regarding
the potential collateral consequences of a guilty plea, rather than saying something at the
"risk of saying something wrong").
313 See generally, for example, Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining outside the
Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv L Rev 2463 (2004) (arguing that the likely outcome of trial
has a more minimal influence on plea bargains than is generally assumed, due to a com-
bination of structural issues, including agency costs and cognitive biases on the part of
the participants).
314 Julian A. Cook III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and the Rail-
roading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U Colo L Rev 863, 864-65 (2004).
315 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea
Bargaining, 91 Marq L Rev 163, 176 (2007), quoting Gerben A. van Kleef, Carsten K.W.
De Dreu, and Antony S.R. Manstead, The Interpersonal Effects of Emotions in Negotia-
tions: A Motivated Information Processing Approach, 87 J Personality & Soc Psychology
510, 516 (2004).
316 See Bibas, 117 Harv L Rev at 2496-2519 (cited in note 313) (noting that these
psychological pitfalls include "self-serving biases and overconfident optimism," "denial
mechanisms and psychological blocks that may prevent the parties from seeing the weak-
nesses in their own cases," "discounting of future costs," "loss aversion and risk aversion,"
susceptibility to "framing," and "anchoring and adjustment").
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reviewing voir dire noted by the Supreme Court in Gomez.317
Flaws in how voluntary or knowing the plea was may thus be dif-
ficult to identify after the plea has been accepted, such that even
defendants with fair and just reasons for withdrawal may some-
times be denied the right to withdraw. Therefore, while de novo
review of the colloquy remains a valuable safeguard against pro-
cedural errors, it may be insufficient to afford equivalent protec-
tion to defendants whose colloquies are conducted before magis-
trate judges and those whose colloquies are heard by Article III
judges. If plea colloquies provide suboptimal rights protection
even before Article III judges, as many fear, any diminution in
that protection caused by delegation of the task to magistrate
judges is particularly worrisome.
For defendants who perform their plea colloquies before mag-
istrate judges, then, temporal separation before plea acceptance
by a district judge would be a valuable additional safeguard.
Such an additional safeguard may be necessary to ensure that
defendants receive equivalent protection regardless of who con-
ducts their plea colloquies. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit's as-
sertions in Benton, the practice of allowing "defendants to use
magistrate-led colloquies as go-throughs in order to gauge
whether they may later experience 'buyer's remorse' is not a
waste of resources.318 Significant postplea, presentencing regret
may indicate flaws in how voluntary or knowing the plea was,
supporting a defendant's right to trial. The additional time for re-
flection could also promote optimal information processing and
help to counter the psychological pitfalls of the plea process. 319
In most cases, allowing magistrate judges to conduct plea col-
loquies-but not to formally accept pleas-would produce identical
317 Gomez, 490 US at 874 (noting "serious doubts that a district judge could review
[voir dire] meaningfully").
318 Benton, 523 F3d at 432-33.
319 Indeed, this argument could easily be extended to suggest that all defendants
should get the benefit of temporal separation between the colloquy and plea acceptance.
As a matter of policy, this may be correct, but it is certainly not required by current federal
law. To the extent that defendants are then subject to somewhat different procedures de-
pending on whether they proceed before a magistrate judge or an Article III judge, this
type of "tactical decision" about whether to proceed before a magistrate judge or a district
judge is already one that defendants and their lawyers must make in many cases. Gonzalez,
553 US at 249-51. Further, by making the delegation of duties to magistrate judges sub-
ject to the discretion of district court judges, Congress has ensured that there will be dis-
crepancies in the treatment of different defendants, unless one considers magistrate judges
to be strictly equivalent to Article III judges (which neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court has suggested).
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results as allowing magistrate judges to accept pleas. Defendants
who truly meet the requirements for entering a plea2o have little
reason to seek to withdraw their plea before a district judge ac-
cepts it. While one could easily envision a defendant seeking to
withdraw his plea after sentencing, particularly if the sentence is
harsher than expected, the district judge must accept the plea be-
fore sentencing, eliminating this possibility. Thus, granting de-
fendants additional postplea time to reflect on their decision is a
relatively low-cost way to protect defendants' rights.
CONCLUSION
Magistrate judges are integral to the modern judiciary, but
their power to accept duties delegated by Article III judges is
not unbounded. The precise boundaries of their power under the
Additional Duties Clause of the FMA are unclear, though, given
the broad wording of the Act. This ambiguity has led to a divide
among the circuits, with three circuits permitting magistrate
judges to accept guilty pleas and one circuit explicitly denying
magistrate judges this power. For defendants who seek to with-
draw their plea after the plea colloquy, but before sentencing, the
circuit's rule on this issue makes the difference between proceed-
ing to trial and proceeding to sentencing.
To date, courts that have considered this issue focused on the
importance and complexity of plea acceptance in the abstract. This
Comment proposes that, instead, courts should look to Congress
for guidance on the importance of plea acceptance relative to
other duties that may be delegated to magistrate judges. The
FRCrP provide this guidance by highlighting the unique im-
portance of felony guilty pleas through the procedural protections
provided for such pleas. Permitting magistrate judges to perform
plea colloquies, but not to accept guilty pleas, would have limited
impact on systemic efficiency and would provide an important
safeguard for defendants' rights.
Beyond addressing felony guilty pleas, this Comment pro-
vides the first objective framework for analyzing the scope of the
Additional Duties Clause. Implementing this approach in deci-
sions regarding the scope of the Additional Duties Clause will
320 Defendants should understand the charges against them and the consequences of
their plea, enter the plea voluntarily, and make a plea with a factual basis. See
FRCrP 11(b).
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enable more consistency in future cases, potentially avoiding ad-
ditional circuit splits and the need for ongoing Supreme Court
oversight. As a further benefit, grounding the analysis in the
FRCrP also promotes a straightforward path for dialogue be-
tween the courts and Congress on these issues.

